Core Path · L3.5.09

Intraday liquidity

12 minLiquidity riskPaymentsIntraday liquidityBCBS 248

By the end you will be able to

  1. 1Explain how a real-time gross settlement system such as CHAPS works, and why a bank needs liquidity during the day as well as at its end.
  2. 2Compute the net cumulative position and the daily maximum intraday liquidity usage, and read its empirical distribution over a year.
  3. 3Apply the BCBS 248 monitoring tools and intraday stress scenarios to a bank's payments.
  4. 4Describe how banks manage intraday liquidity, and why it draws on the same buffer as the 30-day stress.

Why it matters

On 21 November 1985 a software failure left the Bank of New York unable to pass on the US Treasury securities it was receiving for its customers. It kept paying for the securities that arrived, but could not deliver them on and collect the cash. By the end of the day the hole was so large that it borrowed $22.6 billion overnight from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a record at the time. Its problem was a computer, not its balance sheet. It had run out of money in the middle of a working day.

Core explanation

Liquidity within the day

Everything so far in this module has counted cash at the end of each day: the ladder of L3.5.04: Cash flow ladders and maturity gaps, the 90-day stress test of L3.5.05: Liquidity stress tests and survival horizons, the buffer of L3.5.06: The liquidity buffer. Payments do not wait for the end of the day. A bank sends and receives thousands of them, each of which must be funded the moment it settles. The cash it needs for that is its intraday liquidity.

How large payments settle

Large-value payments in most countries settle by real-time gross settlement (RTGS). In the UK the system is CHAPS, which settles each payment individually across the participants' accounts at the Bank of England. In 2024 it settled over £344 billion each working day, on average, for over 35 direct participants (Bank of England). CHAPS settles from 06:00 to 18:00, Monday to Friday; in February 2026 the Bank confirmed it will open at 01:30 from September 2027.

Gross settlement is safe: each payment is final, so the failure of one bank cannot unwind a whole batch of netted payments. The price is liquidity. A payment settles only if the sender has the money in its account at that moment. A bank's sources are its reserves at the central bank, intraday credit from the central bank against collateral, and the payments other banks send it. The Bank of England has long provided intraday liquidity to CHAPS banks against eligible collateral, free of charge. The Federal Reserve has, since March 2011, charged nothing for collateralised daylight overdrafts and a 50bp annual rate on uncollateralised ones.

Free intraday credit still uses collateral, and collateral pledged to the central bank for the day is collateral the bank cannot use for anything else. So every bank would rather pay out of what it receives. If every bank waits for the others, payments queue up that could all have settled: a gridlock. That is why CHAPS has throughput guidelines, requiring participants to settle set proportions of their payments by set times of day, and why regulators measure throughput.

RiskAtoms Bank's payment day

Illustrative dataRiskAtoms Bank plc's liquidity book

A £67bn balance sheet on one made-up reporting date, in pounds: every line's contractual maturity, its HQLA level, LCR rate and NSFR factors, the undrawn facilities and collateral triggers, and a daily 90-day stress test in three scenarios. The numbers are round illustrative values, not any bank's data, and the cash flows are principal only (no interest). The same book runs through every lesson in Module 3.5, so the figures agree.

Extra for this lesson: 250 business days of the bank's sterling payments over its settlement account, generated from a fixed seed: on average £8.0bn sent and £7.9bn received a day, in about 700 payments of very different sizes, with two time-specific obligations early in the morning (a pay-in to an FX settlement system at 07:00 and a margin payment to a CCP at 08:30, together £0.70bn on an average day). Incoming payments arrive about 35 minutes later on average than outgoing ones, and month ends are busier. Twelve counterparties send the payments; the largest sends 18% of the value. None of it is real payment data.

Follow the running total of received less sent: the net cumulative position. Its lowest point is how much money the bank needed to have that day: the daily maximum intraday liquidity usage. On the median day (day 85) the position fell to −£1.39bn at 10:01, then recovered to end the day in surplus. On the worst day of the year (day 173) it fell to −£3.64bn and never came back above zero.

ExploreOne day on the settlement account

The running total of payments received less payments sent, from the moment CHAPS opens. Pick a day.

−£1.0bn−£0.5bn£0bn£0.5bn£1.0bn£1.5bn06:0007:4009:2011:0012:4014:2016:0017:40Time of day
Net cumulative position
Daily maximum usage£1.39bn
Lowest point reached at10:01
Payments settled942
Largest positive position£1.44bn
Sent£9.37bn
Received£10.81bn
Time-specific payments out£566m at 07:00, £462m at 08:30

The bank needs the depth of the dip, not the end-of-day total: a day can end in surplus and still have needed billions at ten in the morning. The early drop is the time-specific payments; the recovery comes as counterparties pay in, later on average than the bank pays out.

A year of days: the BCBS 248 tools

One day says little. In April 2013 the Basel Committee published Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management (BCBS 248): seven tools, reported monthly, for monitoring rather than as a limit. Usage is reported as the three largest days in the period and the average. On the bank's year:

BCBS 248 toolRiskAtoms Bank, 250 days
A(i) Daily maximum intraday liquidity usagelargest £3.64bn, £3.28bn, £3.11bn; average £1.47bn
A(ii) Available intraday liquidity at the start of the day£11.39bn: reserves £6.0bn, gilts £5.39bn after a 2% haircut
A(iii) Total paymentssent £8.00bn a day on average (largest £12.63bn); received £7.95bn
A(iv) Time-specific obligations£0.70bn a day on average
B(i) and B(ii) Correspondent bankingnot applicable: the bank is a direct participant only
C(i) Intraday throughput55% of outgoing value by 12:00, 76% by 14:00

The distribution behind tool A(i) is the empirical distribution of M-D02: Histograms and empirical distributions. In bins of £500m:

0204060800.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.5Days, 0.0: 6Days, 0.5: 55Days, 1.0: 76Days, 1.5: 72Days, 2.0: 22Days, 2.5: 13Days, 3.0: 5Days, 3.5: 199th percentile £3.11bnDaysDaily maximum usage, £bn (each bin starts at the value shown)

The shape is skewed to the right: most days need £0.5bn to £2bn, a few need much more. F̂ at £2.5bn is 92.4%: 231 of the 250 days needed no more. The 95th percentile is £2.68bn, the 99th £3.11bn. Against £11.39bn available at the start of the day, the bank looks comfortable. Two things change that: stress, and the rest of the module.

Intraday stress

BCBS 248 asks banks to look at four intraday stress scenarios. Predict what each does to the bank's year before you reveal it.

Four intraday stresses

Managing it

The Basel Committee's 2008 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision put it in one line (Principle 8): “A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions.” In practice a payments treasury forecasts the day's flows (asking large customers for theirs), watches the position in real time, keeps collateral at the central bank, settles time-critical payments first, and paces the rest within the throughput rules. Holding the bank's non-critical payments back by an hour cuts its average usage from £1.47bn to £0.83bn, but its throughput by noon falls from 55% to 45%: the saving is other banks' cost.

The last point is the one that ties this lesson to the rest of the module. The reserves and gilts that fund the day are the same £13.7bn buffer that the LCR counts and the stress test spends. If the bank keeps its 99th percentile day, £3.11bn, free for payments throughout the combined stress, survival falls from 47 days to 20. An intraday need is not covered by a 30-day, end-of-day ratio; it has to be added to it.

The formal version

Number a day's payments j=1,…,mj = 1, \dots, m in the order they settle, with time tjt_j, amount received rjr_j and amount sent sjs_j (one of them zero). For each day dd of nn:

Nd(t)=∑j : tj≤t(rj−sj)Ud=max⁡(0,  −min⁡tNd(t))(BCBS 248 tool A(i))F^(u)=#{d:Ud≤u}nqp=U(k),k=⌈np⌉(nearest rank)\begin{aligned} N_d(t) &= \sum_{j\,:\,t_j \le t} (r_j - s_j) \\ U_d &= \max\Big(0,\; -\min_{t} N_d(t)\Big) \qquad \text{(BCBS 248 tool A(i))} \\ \hat F(u) &= \frac{\#\{d : U_d \le u\}}{n} \\ q_p &= U_{(k)}, \qquad k = \lceil np \rceil \qquad \text{(nearest rank)} \end{aligned}

For the bank, n=250n = 250 and k=⌈250×0.99⌉=248k = \lceil 250 \times 0.99 \rceil = 248: the 99th percentile is the third largest day, which is why the three largest days tell a supervisor about the tail. Throughput by hour hh is ∑j:tj<hsj/∑jsj\sum_{j: t_j < h} s_j \big/ \sum_j s_j, averaged over the days. A stress scenario changes the payments (delays the rjr_j, or removes those from one counterparty) and the whole calculation is run again: usage is path-dependent, so it cannot be scaled from the normal year.

Try it

Put the bank's year through the BCBS 248 stresses, hold its own payments back, and raise the central bank's haircut. Watch the histogram shift and the 99th percentile move against the liquidity available at the start of the day.

Try itA year of payments under stress

Intraday stress scenario

0204060800.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.5Days, 0.0: 6Days, 0.5: 55Days, 1.0: 76Days, 1.5: 72Days, 2.0: 22Days, 2.5: 13Days, 3.0: 5Days, 3.5: 199th percentile £3.11bnDaysDaily maximum usage, £bn (bins £0.5bn wide, from the value shown)
Average daily maximum usage£1.47bn
99th percentile (3rd largest)£3.11bn
Three largest days£3.64bn, £3.28bn, £3.11bn
95th percentile£2.68bn
F̂(£2.50bn): days at or below92.4%
Outgoing value settled by 12:0055%
Available at the start of the day£11.39bn
Available ÷ 99th percentile3.7×
Combined stress survival with the 99th percentile held back20 days (from 47)
Average received a day£7.95bn

Holding payments back cuts the bank's own usage, but its throughput falls and its counterparties wait for their money: if every bank did it, payments would gridlock. The stresses work the other way: counterparties that delay or stop paying the bank push the dip deeper.

Worked example

From payments to a reserve in the stress test

RiskAtoms Bank, 250 business days

Step 1 of 5
  1. 1

    Run the total

    The first payments of the median day (day 85), in £m:

    TimePaymentNet cumulative position
    06:36+£6.0m£6.0m
    06:36+£26.9m£32.9m
    06:37−£21.1m£11.8m
    06:38+£2.0m£13.8m
    07:00−£566.0m (time-specific)−£552.2m
    07:05−£10.2m−£562.4m

    The 07:00 pay-in, a time-specific obligation, takes the position from £13.8m to −£552.2m. The lowest point of the whole day, at 10:01, is −£1,394.5m, so U=£1,394.5mU = \text{£}1{,}394.5\text{m}.

What the payments treasury notes

Normal year: average daily maximum usage £1.47bn, 99th percentile £3.11bn. Combined intraday stress: £5.83bn. Reserve the stressed figure inside the 90-day stress test, not on top of an LCR that does not see it. Throughput by noon 55%: within the bank's target, and no room to slow payments further without breaching it.

Regulatory lens

Basel. Principle 8 of the 2008 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision asks banks to manage intraday liquidity under normal and stressed conditions, and lists the operational elements: measuring expected daily gross flows, monitoring positions against available resources, arranging intraday funding, mobilising collateral, managing the timing of outflows, and being ready for disruptions. BCBS 248 (April 2013) added the seven monitoring tools and the four stress scenarios, for internationally active banks, with monthly reporting from 1 January 2015. They are monitoring tools, not a ratio with a minimum.

UK. The PRA's supervisory statement SS24/15 says intraday liquidity risk exposures are material for firms and expects them to analyse the risk in normal and stressed conditions, including delayed incoming payments, credit lines withdrawn or secured, and large client defaults. Direct participants should be able to calculate their maximum net debit position in each system, and the PRA may expect HQLA held for intraday needs to be usable within the day. The detail of the UK liquidity framework, the ILAAP and Pillar 2, comes in M4.5: Liquidity and IRRBB regulation.

Spark Atoms

Spark AtomA record loan for a software bug
The Bank of New York's $22.6 billion borrowing in November 1985 came from a computer problem, not a credit problem: the bank was paying for securities it could not deliver on. The episode became a textbook case for central banks of what an operational failure in the payment system can do to a bank's intraday position, and why a lender of last resort must be ready even at the end of a quiet day.
Spark AtomPayments that never sleep
CHAPS will open at 01:30 instead of 06:00 from September 2027, and the Bank of England consulted in May 2026 on a settlement day at the weekend and an ambition of near 24-hour, seven-day settlement around the turn of the decade. A longer day spreads payments out, but it also means treasury teams, collateral and intraday credit have to be ready for more hours of the day.

Key takeaways

  • RTGS systems such as CHAPS settle each payment in full when it is made, so a bank must fund every payment as it goes: reserves, intraday credit against collateral, or incoming payments.
  • Daily maximum intraday liquidity usage is the lowest point of the running total of received less sent; a day can end in surplus and still need billions at mid-morning.
  • Over 250 days the bank's usage averages £1.47bn, with a 99th percentile (the third largest day) of £3.11bn.
  • BCBS 248 gives seven monitoring tools and four stresses (own, counterparty, customer bank, market-wide); delayed or missing incoming payments deepen the dip sharply.
  • Intraday needs draw on the same buffer as the 30-day stress: reserving the 99th percentile cuts the combined stress survival from 47 to 20 days.

Reaction

Check what stuck

Question 1 · objective 2

A bank's payments settle in this order: sends £300m, receives £120m, sends £250m, receives £500m, sends £200m. What is its daily maximum intraday liquidity usage, in £m?

£m

Question 2 · objective 1

Why does real-time gross settlement need more liquidity during the day than settling once, net, at the end?

Question 3 · objective 2

Over 250 business days, 9 days had a daily maximum usage above £3bn. What is the empirical share F̂(£3bn) of days at or below £3bn, in %?

%

Question 4 · objective 2

With 250 days of usage and the nearest-rank rule k = ⌈np⌉, which sorted value (counting from the smallest) is the 99th percentile?

Question 5 · objective 3

In the BCBS 248 intraday stress scenarios, what is a counterparty stress?

Glossary

RTGS
Real-time gross settlement: each payment is settled on its own, in full and with finality, in central bank money, the moment it is processed, provided the payer has the money in its account.
CHAPS
The UK's high-value sterling payment system. Each payment settles individually in real time across the participants' accounts at the Bank of England.
Intraday liquidity
Intraday liquidity: money a bank can use during the business day to make its payments on time: its reserves, intraday credit from the central bank, and payments it receives.
Intraday credit
Intraday credit: an overdraft or repo from the central bank (or a correspondent bank) that must be repaid before the end of the day, usually secured on collateral.
Net cumulative position
Net cumulative position: the running total, through the day, of payments received less payments sent over the settlement account.
Daily maximum intraday liquidity usage
Daily maximum intraday liquidity usage: the largest negative net cumulative position of payments received less payments sent during the day.
Time-specific obligation
Time-specific obligation: a payment that must settle by a set time in the day, such as a pay-in to an FX settlement system or a margin payment to a CCP.
Throughput
Throughput: the share of a bank's outgoing payments, by value, settled by a given time of day.
Gridlock
Gridlock: banks each wait for the others' payments before sending their own, so payments queue that could all have settled.
Correspondent bank
Correspondent bank: a bank that makes and receives payments on behalf of other banks that are not direct members of the payment system.

Deep Dives & Origins

Deep Dives

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management (BCBS 248), Bank for International Settlements, April 2013. Intermediate.
  • Bank of England, “A brief introduction to the Real-Time Gross Settlement system and CHAPS”. Introductory.
  • H. M. Ennis and D. A. Price, “Discount window lending: policy trade-offs and the 1985 BoNY computer failure”, Economic Brief 15-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, May 2015. Introductory.

Origins

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management, April 2013; and OSFI, Liquidity Adequacy Requirements, Chapter 7: Intraday liquidity monitoring tools (which reproduces them).
  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision, September 2008, Principle 8 (Basel Framework consolidated guidelines, LQY10.84 to 10.95).
  • Bank of England, “A brief introduction to the Real-Time Gross Settlement system and CHAPS” (2024 statistics).
  • Bank of England, Payment Systems Oversight Report 2007, annex (intraday liquidity for CHAPS members; throughput guidelines).
  • Bank of England, confirmation of the CHAPS early-morning extension (February 2026) and consultation on extending RTGS and CHAPS settlement hours (18 May 2026), as reported by Regulation Tomorrow.
  • Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, press release on the Payment System Risk policy implementation date, 30 September 2010.
  • Prudential Regulation Authority, SS24/15 The PRA's approach to supervising liquidity and funding risks, October 2025 version.
  • H. M. Ennis and D. A. Price, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief 15-05, May 2015.

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