Core Path · L3.4.02

Exposure measures

12 minCounterparty credit riskPFEExpected exposureEffective EPE

Know these first

By the end you will be able to

  1. 1Define current exposure, PFE, EE and EPE, and say which question each answers.
  2. 2Compute EE and PFE at a date from simulated paths, and EPE and effective EPE over the first year.
  3. 3Explain effective EE and why regulators multiply effective EPE by alpha 1.4.
  4. 4Read the exposure profiles of the book's four netting sets.

Why it matters

The credit committee asks: how much could RiskAtoms Bank lose to Corriemoor Bank? The desk can give five honest answers. Nothing today (£0m). On average £6.25m in a year. Up to £43.9m in a bad case, about three years out. £4.45m averaged over the coming year. Or £6.24m for the capital calculation. They are all correct; each answers a different question. This lesson defines them and computes each one on the book.

Core explanation

From paths to numbers

Illustrative dataRiskAtoms Bank plc's OTC derivatives book

Eight trades with four invented counterparties, in pounds, on one made-up valuation day, valued on 2,000 simulated paths (seed 34040) of a flat GBP rate (4.00% today), GBPUSD (1.30) and an equity index (8,000) every half month out to ten years. The firms, trades and market model are made up for teaching; none is real data. The same book runs through every lesson in Module 3.4, so the figures agree.

All figures here are without collateral, even for the three counterparties with a CSA: collateral comes in L3.4.05: Collateral and the CSA.

The previous lesson (L3.4.01: What counterparty credit risk is) showed that a netting set's exposure at a future date is a random quantity, E(t)=max⁡(V(t),0)E(t) = \max(V(t), 0). The bank simulates the market forward (here on 2,000 paths, the method of L3.2.11: Monte Carlo VaR), values the trades on every path and date, and so gets 2,000 possible exposures for each date. Every exposure measure is a way of summarising those numbers.

One date: the distribution of exposure

Here is Corriemoor's exposure in one year across the 2,000 paths. On 48.9% of them the netting set is worth less than nothing to the bank, so the exposure is zero. The rest spread out to the right.

0%10%20%30%40%50%0261014182226303438+Share of paths, 0: 49%Share of paths, 0: 5%Share of paths, 2: 5%Share of paths, 4: 5%Share of paths, 6: 4%Share of paths, 8: 5%Share of paths, 10: 4%Share of paths, 12: 4%Share of paths, 14: 4%Share of paths, 16: 3%Share of paths, 18: 3%Share of paths, 20: 2%Share of paths, 22: 2%Share of paths, 24: 1%Share of paths, 26: 1%Share of paths, 28: 1%Share of paths, 30: 1%Share of paths, 32: 0%Share of paths, 34: 1%Share of paths, 36: 0%Share of paths, 38+: 0%EE £6.3mPFE 95% £24.3mCorriemoor's exposure in one year (£m, lower edge of each £2m bar; first bar: exactly zero)

Two summaries of one date's distribution matter most:

  • Potential future exposure (PFE) is a high quantile (M-C09: Quantiles), the exposure exceeded on only 5% (or 1%) of paths. For Corriemoor in a year: £19.5m at 90%, £24.3m at 95%, £35.3m at 99%. It is the exposure cousin of VaR (L2.5.06: Value at risk: the idea), and it drives credit limits.
  • Expected exposure (EE) is the mean (M-C02: Expectation), zeros included: £6.25m. It is what a default would cost on average, before recovery, and it drives pricing (CVA in L3.4.10: CVA basics) and capital.

Today the distribution is a single number, the current exposure: zero for the three netting sets that are at market, and £18.98m for Saltney, whose put the bank owns.

All dates: the exposure profile

Repeat for every date and you get an exposure profile. Corriemoor's EE climbs to £10.89m at about 3 years; its 95% PFE peaks at £43.9m. Two time averages compress a profile into one number:

  • Expected positive exposure (EPE): the average of EE over a period. Over the first year, Corriemoor's is £4.45m.
  • Effective EPE: the same average of effective EE, a version of EE that is never allowed to fall. Corriemoor's EE rises through its first year, so the two barely differ: £4.46m.

Why never allowed to fall? Halvergate's FX forward matures at one year, and its EE drops when it does. But a client that hedges its dollar sales will very likely do another forward. Effective EE holds the exposure at its earlier peak to cover that rollover risk. The worked example shows it.

The four netting sets

UncollateralisedHALCORSALEBB
Current exposure£0.00m£0.00m£18.98m£0.00m
EE in 1 year£1.94m£6.25m£19.92m£7.44m
PFE 95% in 1 year£7.95m£24.33m£65.76m£30.14m
Peak PFE 95%£13.8m£43.9m£103.5m£51.1m
… reached after1.0y3.0y2.0y4.0y
One-year EPE£2.12m£4.45m£19.26m£5.67m
One-year effective EPE£2.15m£4.46m£19.30m£5.69m
EAD = 1.4 × effective EPE£3.00m£6.24m£27.02m£7.97m

Saltney's numbers are dominated by the put the bank owns: worth £19.0m already, it is all exposure. Ebbsworth's single ten-year swap has a one-year EPE of £5.67m but a peak PFE of £51.1m, four years out: the one-year measures used for capital look only at the near future.

Which measure answers which question?

Why alpha is 1.4

Capital models for loans treat exposure at default as a fixed number. Effective EPE turns a random, moving exposure into such a number, a loan-equivalent. But it is an average: it ignores that exposures to many counterparties can rise together when markets move, that a few large counterparties make the portfolio lumpy, and that exposure may grow just as the counterparty weakens (wrong-way risk, L3.4.11: Wrong-way risk). Alpha scales effective EPE up to cover these. It is defined as the ratio of economic capital from a full simulation of exposures and defaults to the capital you get by treating EPE as a fixed loan amount. Industry studies in 2003 put it near 1.1 for large, diversified portfolios; the Basel Committee set 1.4, conservatively, and lets supervisors ask for more.

The formal version

Write Vj(tk)V_j(t_k) for the netting set's value on path jj (of NN) at grid date tkt_k. The exact measures are an expectation and a quantile of E(t)=max⁡(V(t),0)E(t) = \max(V(t), 0); the simulation estimates them.

EE(t)=E[max⁡(V(t),0)]≈1N∑j=1Nmax⁡(Vj(t),0)PFEq(t)=inf⁡{x:Pr⁡(E(t)≤x)≥q}≈the q-quantile of E1(t),…,EN(t)EPE(0,T)=1T∫0TEE(t) dt≈∑kEE(tk) ΔtkT\begin{aligned} \text{EE}(t) &= \mathbb E\bigl[\max(V(t), 0)\bigr] &&\approx \frac{1}{N}\sum_{j=1}^{N} \max\bigl(V_j(t), 0\bigr) \\ \text{PFE}_q(t) &= \inf\{x : \Pr(E(t) \le x) \ge q\} &&\approx \text{the } q\text{-quantile of } E_1(t), \dots, E_N(t) \\ \text{EPE}(0, T) &= \frac{1}{T}\int_0^{T} \text{EE}(t)\,dt &&\approx \sum_{k} \text{EE}(t_k)\,\frac{\Delta t_k}{T} \end{aligned}

The quantile is read off the sorted exposures. With NN paths, the book puts the qq-quantile at position q(N−1)q(N-1) in the sorted list (counting from 0) and interpolates between neighbours, as in historical VaR. The EE estimate has a standard error of s/Ns/\sqrt N, where ss is the sample standard deviation of the exposures (with N−1N - 1). The book integrates EPE with the trapezium rule on its half-month grid; Basel's sum over grid dates gives almost the same number on a grid this fine.

Because effective EE is a running maximum, Eff EEk≥EEk\text{Eff EE}_k \ge \text{EE}_k on every date, so effective EPE is never below EPE. The two are equal whenever EE rises throughout the first year.

Try it

Pick a netting set and a quantile. The chart shows its profile out to ten years; the slider shows the distribution of exposure on one date. Then re-run the simulation with fresh paths and see which numbers hold still.

Try itExposure lab: the book's netting sets

Counterparty (no collateral)

PFE quantile

Corriemoor Bank AG

£0m£10m£20m£30m£40m0y1y2y3y4y5y6y7y8y9y10yYears from today1.0y
Expected exposure (EE)Effective EEPFE at 95%
0%1%2%3%4%1.68.114.621.027.534.0Share of paths, 1.6: 4%Share of paths, 3.2: 4%Share of paths, 4.9: 4%Share of paths, 6.5: 4%Share of paths, 8.1: 3%Share of paths, 9.7: 4%Share of paths, 11.3: 3%Share of paths, 13.0: 3%Share of paths, 14.6: 3%Share of paths, 16.2: 3%Share of paths, 17.8: 2%Share of paths, 19.4: 3%Share of paths, 21.0: 2%Share of paths, 22.7: 1%Share of paths, 24.3: 1%Share of paths, 25.9: 1%Share of paths, 27.5: 1%Share of paths, 29.1: 1%Share of paths, 30.8: 1%Share of paths, 32.4: 0%Share of paths, 34.0: 0%Share of paths, 35.6: 1%Share of paths, 37.2: 0%Share of paths, 38.9: 1%Positive exposure in 1.0 years, upper edge of each bar (£m)
EE in 1.0 years£6.25m
PFE 95% in 1.0 years£24.33m
Paths with zero exposure then48.9%
Effective EE then£6.54m
Current exposure today£0.00m
Peak PFE 95%£43.93m
One-year EPE£4.45m
One-year effective EPE£4.46m
EAD = 1.4 × effective EPE£6.24m

Run it again on fresh paths

The book uses 2,000 paths and one seed. Re-run COR's simulation with a new seed and fewer paths, and see how much each measure moves. Means settle fast; high quantiles do not.

Paths

0 / 500 paths
MeasureBook (2,000 paths)Fresh run
EE in 1 year£6.25m–
PFE 95% in 1 year£24.33m–
One-year EPE£4.45m–
One-year effective EPE£4.46m–

Illustrative: the Module 3.4 book, uncollateralised exposure (collateral comes later in the module). Profiles are rounded to £1,000.

Worked example

Halvergate's measures, step by step

Halvergate has no CSA: a seven-year receive-fixed swap on £100m and a one-year forward buying $65m. Both are at market today. The bank simulates 2,000 paths.

From 2,000 paths to EAD

Step 1 of 5
  1. 1

    Current exposure

    Both trades are worth zero today, so E(0)=max⁡(0,0)=0E(0) = \max(0, 0) = 0. The current exposure is nil, yet the trades carry real risk.

Same paths, same numbers

These figures come from the book's fixed seed, so every lesson in the module quotes the same £2.12m EPE for Halvergate. A different seed would move EE in one year by a few times the £0.06m standard error, and the 95% PFE by more.

Regulatory lens

The Basel Framework's definitions (CRE50) match this lesson: current exposure, peak exposure (a high percentile, typically 95% or 99%), expected exposure, EPE, effective EE and effective EPE. Under the internal model method (CRE53), EAD is alpha times effective EPE, with alpha set at 1.4. Supervisors can require more, for example where the bank has few counterparties, high general wrong-way risk or highly correlated exposures, and a bank may estimate its own alpha with approval, subject to a floor of 1.2. Under Basel III the bank must also compute effective EPE with model parameters calibrated to a stressed period and hold whichever capital charge is larger, for the portfolio as a whole. Most banks use the standardised approach, SA-CCR, which has its own replacement cost and add-on and keeps the same alpha. Both are in M4.4: Counterparty, operational and large exposures; exposure simulation in depth is in M6.6: Counterparty risk and XVA.

Spark Atoms

Spark AtomAn alpha chosen with a margin
ISDA later recalled that alpha was “conservatively set in 2003 to 1.4x using industry estimates”: the base case of one industry study gave about 1.08 for a portfolio of 200 counterparties. When the Basel Committee let banks model their own alpha in 2005, it floored it at 1.2 (ISDA letter to the Basel Committee, March 2017).
Spark AtomOne acronym, two meanings
In risk management, PFE is a quantile of future exposure, used for limits. In the standardised SA-CCR rules, “PFE” is the name of a formula-based add-on that sits on top of replacement cost. The same three letters, measured in completely different ways: always ask which one is meant.

Key takeaways

  • Current exposure is today's max(V, 0); everything else summarises the simulated distribution of future exposure.
  • PFE is a high quantile (limits); EE is the mean, zeros included (pricing and capital).
  • EPE averages EE over time; effective EE never falls, which covers rollover of maturing trades.
  • EAD under the internal model method = 1.4 × effective EPE: Halvergate £2.15m → £3.00m.
  • Corriemoor: EE in a year £6.25m, peak 95% PFE £43.9m, effective EPE £4.46m.
  • Means settle quickly as paths are added; high quantiles need many more paths.

Reaction

Check what stuck

Question 1 · objective 1

Five simulated paths give exposures in one year of £0m, £0m, £2m, £4m and £9m. What is the expected exposure in one year, in £m?

£m

Question 2 · objective 2

A netting set's EE at 3, 6, 9 and 12 months is £1m, £3m, £2m and £2m. Using quarterly steps, what is its effective EPE, in £m?

£m

Question 3 · objective 3

Under the internal model method, what EAD goes with that effective EPE of £2.5m, in £m?

£m

Question 4 · objective 1

A credit officer sets a limit on how large exposure to a hedge fund could get. Which measure fits?

Question 5 · objective 2

Why does effective EE never fall, even when a big trade in the netting set matures?

Glossary

Current exposure (CE)
Current exposure: max(V, 0) today, the replacement cost if the counterparty defaulted now.
Potential future exposure (PFE)
Potential future exposure (PFE): a high quantile (often 95% or 99%) of the exposure distribution at a future date. Basel calls it peak exposure.
Expected exposure (EE)
Expected exposure (EE): the mean of the exposure distribution at a future date, counting the paths with zero exposure.
Expected positive exposure (EPE)
Expected positive exposure (EPE): the time-weighted average of EE over a period, usually the first year.
Effective EE
Effective EE: EE made non-decreasing. At each date it is the larger of that date's EE and the effective EE before it.
Effective EPE
Effective EPE: the time-weighted average of effective EE over the first year (or to maturity, if sooner).
Alpha (α)
Alpha (α): the multiplier, 1.4 by default, that turns effective EPE into exposure at default under the internal model method.
Exposure profile
Exposure profile: a measure such as EE or PFE plotted against future dates.
Rollover risk
Rollover risk: short-dated trades that mature are usually replaced by new ones, so exposure that seems to fall away often comes back.

Deep Dives & Origins

Deep Dives

  • J. Gregory, The xVA Challenge, 4th ed., Wiley, 2020, the chapter on quantifying exposure. Intermediate.
  • M. Pykhtin and S. Zhu, “A guide to modelling counterparty credit risk”, GARP Risk Review, July/August 2007, pp. 16–22. Advanced.

Origins

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Framework, CRE50 (definitions) and CRE53 (internal models method for counterparty credit risk), BIS.
  • E. Canabarro, E. Picoult and T. Wilde, “Analysing counterparty risk”, Risk16(9), September 2003, pp. 117–122.
  • ISDA, letter to the Basel Committee on SA-CCR, 20 March 2017.

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