Core Path · L2.3.08

Risk culture and incentives

10 minCultureRemuneration

By the end you will be able to

  1. 1Explain how pay and culture shape risk-taking, using Barings as the case.
  2. 2Describe how deferral, malus and clawback work, and calculate what each can reach.
  3. 3Spot the red flags of a weak risk culture using the FSB's four indicators.
  4. 4Name the main rules on pay in the EU, UK, US and Asia-Pacific.

Why it matters

Barings' draft accounts for 1994 showed a profit of £102 million before tax, after setting aside about the same again for bonuses. Hidden in a Singapore error account were losses of over £200 million. The bank was paying bonuses on profits that did not exist.

Core explanation

People do what they are rewarded for

You met the collapse of Barings in L1.7.12: Derivatives disasters and their lessons: one trader in Singapore, Nick Leeson, hid losses that reached £827 million by February 1995, more than the bank's capital. The usual telling is a story about one rogue. The Bank of England's report (July 1995) told a different one: about managers who did not ask, structures in which nobody was responsible, and rewards that made questions unwelcome. That is risk culture.

Culture is what people do when no rule covers the case and nobody is watching. Every firm has one, good or bad. In 2014 the Financial Stability Board gave supervisors four indicators to look for:

The FSB's four indicators of risk culture (2014)

Spot itRed flags at Barings, 1992 to 1995

Click every sentence that is a warning sign about culture or incentives, then check.

Why pay matters so much. A traditional bank bonus had a built-in asymmetry. A trader who takes a big risk and wins earns a large bonus this year. If the same risk blows up two years later, the bonus has been paid and spent; the firm, its shareholders and sometimes taxpayers carry the loss. Heads I win, tails you lose. Multiply that by thousands of staff and you get a firm that takes on more risk than its owners would choose.

After 2008, the FSB set out Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (April 2009) and implementation standards (September 2009). Their core tools:

Aligning pay with risk

  • Risk-adjusted performance. Measure results after the cost of the risk and capital used, not on revenue alone.
  • Deferral. For senior staff and material risk-takers, 40% to 60% of variable pay held back for at least three years, more for the most senior.
  • Shares, not just cash. A large part paid in shares or share-linked instruments, so the banker shares the firm's later fortunes.
  • Malus and clawback. Cancel deferred pay before it vests, or recover pay already received, if results turn out to be false or risk was mismanaged.
  • Independent control functions. Risk and compliance staff paid on their own objectives, not on the business's revenue (L2.3.03: The CRO and the risk function).

Malus is the easy tool: the firm simply does not hand over money it still holds. Clawback means asking for money back from someone who may have spent it, left the firm or moved abroad, and can end in court. That is why deferral matters: it keeps enough pay within reach of malus.

Try it

A bank awards a €1,000k bonus. Start at the FSB minimum (40% up front, the rest over three years) and move the year in which a problem is found. Then shorten the deferral, or pay everything up front, and see what malus loses.

Try itDeferral, malus and clawback

40%
3 years
1 year
Bonus awarded€1,000k
Already paid or vested€600k
Malus can cancel€400k
Clawback could seek (window 7 years)€600k
Award400kYr 1200kYr 2200kYr 3200k

Solid: paid or vested (only clawback can reach it). Dashed: not yet vested (malus can cancel it).

Found after 1 year, 40% of the bonus is still unvested and can simply be cancelled. The rest has been paid; recovering it means asking for money back.

Worked example

A bonus built on mis-marked positions

A London trader is awarded a bonus of £800k for 2024: 40% at once, the rest in equal slices over 3 years. Eighteen months later, the bank finds that part of the desk's profit came from positions marked at prices the market would not pay.

What the board can reach

Step 1 of 5
  1. 1

    The schedule

    Up front: £800k × 40% = £320k. Deferred: £480k in 3 slices of £160k.

Regulatory lens

  • Global: FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and implementation standards (2009); FSB risk culture guidance (2014); FSB toolkit on misconduct risk (2018).
  • EU: the Capital Requirements Directive caps a banker's variable pay at 100% of fixed pay, or 200% with shareholder approval, and requires multi-year deferral with malus and clawback.
  • UK: the PRA and FCA removed the bonus cap from 31 October 2023 but kept deferral, malus and clawback. The Senior Managers and Certification Regime adds personal accountability.
  • US: SEC Rule 10D-1 (2022) requires listed companies to claw back incentive pay awarded on financial results that are later restated, under exchange rules effective from October 2023.
  • Asia-Pacific: APRA's CPS 511 (in force for large Australian banks from 2023) requires long deferral for senior executives and lets boards cut variable pay for risk and conduct failures; the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Monetary Authority of Singapore have guidelines on sound remuneration.

Sparks

SparkThe headline said clawback
In September 2016 Wells Fargo announced that its chief executive would forfeit all his unvested equity awards, worth about US$41 million, over the bank's sales practices scandal. Newspapers called it a clawback. Strictly, cancelling awards that had not yet vested is malus.
SparkThe bill after Archegos
When Credit Suisse published its Archegos report in July 2021, it also said it had cancelled or clawed back about US$70 million of bonuses from staff involved, and had dismissed several of them.

Key takeaways

  • Risk culture is what people do about risk when no rule covers the case. The FSB looks at tone from the top, accountability, communication and challenge, and incentives.
  • Barings failed through culture as much as fraud: no segregation, unclear responsibility, no challenge to impossible profits, and bonuses paid on them.
  • Bonuses paid at once on revenue reward risk-taking without the downside. Deferral, shares and risk adjustment fix the asymmetry.
  • Malus cancels deferred pay before it vests; clawback recovers pay already received and is much harder.
  • Rules differ: an EU bonus cap, no cap in the UK since October 2023, US mandatory clawback after restatements, long deferral under Australia's CPS 511.

Reaction

Check what stuck

Question 1 · objective 2

What is the difference between malus and clawback?

Question 2 · objective 2

A banker is awarded a bonus of €500,000: 40% paid at once and the rest deferred in equal slices over 4 years. Misconduct comes to light after 2 years. How much, in euros, can malus still cancel?

€

Question 3 · objective 3

Which of these is NOT one of the FSB's four indicators of a sound risk culture (2014)?

Question 4 · objective 1

Why does a bonus paid in full, in cash, on this year's revenue encourage too much risk?

Question 5 · objective 3

At Barings, the Singapore desk's reported profits were far higher than its low-risk strategy could explain. Which indicator failed most directly?

Glossary

Risk culture
Risk culture: the norms, attitudes and behaviours in a firm related to risk awareness, risk-taking and risk management (FSB, 2014).
Variable pay
Variable pay: pay that depends on performance, such as a bonus, on top of fixed salary.
Deferral
Holding back part of a bonus and paying it in slices over later years.
Vesting
The point at which deferred pay becomes the employee's to keep.
Malus
Reducing or cancelling deferred pay before it vests, because of misconduct, error or a failure of risk management.
Clawback
Recovering pay that has already been paid or has vested.
Pay asymmetry
A pay structure in which the employee shares in gains but not in losses, which rewards taking more risk.

Deep Dives & Origins

Deep Dives

  • Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture: A Framework for Assessing Risk Culture, April 2014. Beginner.
  • Financial Stability Board, Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk: A Toolkit for Firms and Supervisors, April 2018. Intermediate.

Origins

  • Bank of England, Board of Banking Supervision, Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings, HMSO, July 1995.
  • Reserve Bank of Australia, “Implications of the Barings Collapse for Bank Supervisors”, Bulletin, November 1995.
  • Financial Stability Forum, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, April 2009; Financial Stability Board, Implementation Standards, September 2009.
  • Wells Fargo & Company, Form 8-K, exhibit 99.1, 27 September 2016; Credit Suisse Group, announcement of the Archegos report, 29 July 2021.
  • US Securities and Exchange Commission, Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation (Rule 10D-1), October 2022.

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